How Two Thai Parties Aim to End the Draft with Volunteer Forces

The political season has turned Thailand’s decades-old เกณฑ์ทหาร debate into headline news again. Two of the country’s largest parties are promising to replace the draft with professional, volunteer soldiers—but their roadmaps, costs and time-lines diverge sharply. Below is a close look at what each side is really offering, why the issue carries new urgency, and what analysts say it could mean for taxpayers, young men and the army’s readiness.

A suddenly high-stakes issue

The push to end mandatory conscription was once a fringe idea, yet soaring public support—polls show 70% now favour abolition—has turned it into an electoral battleground. A spate of camp abuse scandals, a tightening labour market and fresh border flare-ups with Cambodia have combined to make the question of “quality versus quantity” in the ranks a talking-point from Chiang Mai coffee shops to Line group chats in Bangkok. For voters, the stakes range from national security to budget discipline, while for parties it offers a rare chance to court younger citizens who will remember the choice the next time a call-up letter arrives.

Bhumjaithai’s “New National Fence”

Party leader Anutin Charnvirakul rolled out an attention-grabbing slogan—“end the conscription mindset”—and pledged a force of 100,000 fully paid volunteers. Recruits would sign 4-year contracts, earning ฿12,000 monthly, with pathways into the non-commissioned and officer corps. The promise leans heavily on professionalisation, highlighting better skills training and career mobility. Yet critics note a lack of clarity: the party has not confirmed whether 100,000 is an annual quota or a four-year cumulative figure, nor has it published a cost breakdown. Defence accountants warn that a single yearly intake of that size could add more than ฿15B in salaries alone, squeezing funds for equipment if the current spending envelope does not expand. Even so, supporters argue that a fully committed volunteer corps will reduce hidden costs tied to high desertion, mental-health incidents and drug treatment, which insiders say can consume 25-30% of some unit welfare budgets.

People’s Party: slimming the rear, keeping the sharp edge

The People’s Party opts for surgical downsizing rather than headline numbers. Its blueprint abolishes the draft but retains today’s combat head-count by trimming only administrative billets: total uniformed strength would fall from 130,000 to 119,000. At least 30,000 volunteers would be signed each year on the same 4-year contract, extendable to 8. Pay rises by 3% annually, and a severance bonus equal to 2.5 months pay per year served—roughly ฿120,020 after four years—acts as a retention hook. A promise that ordinary soldiers may commute after basic training, rather than live indefinitely in barracks, speaks to recurring stories of hazing and illicit odd-jobs that tarnish the army’s image. The party is also pitching a clearing-house system to match applicants to preferred bases, hoping to widen the pool beyond the traditional military provinces.

Expert verdict: money, morale and manpower

Independent defence economists interviewed by Post Today note that both schemes could, in theory, cut waste because reluctant conscripts often require remedial training and generate higher healthcare bills. A volunteer model, they say, should bring better fitness, higher morale and lower attrition. But to hit Bhumjaithai’s six-figure target, one analyst estimates monthly pay may need to rise to ฿14,000–฿15,000 within three years to keep pace with private-sector wages—raising the annual wage tab to nearly ฿18B. The People’s Party plan, while smaller, still demands new spending on severance funds and a rights-protection office against abuse. Strategists add that Thailand’s jittery eastern frontier means the army cannot afford a recruitment dip during the hand-over; any shortfall would likely be filled by costly short-term contracts or reserves.

Comparing offers at a glance

All figures per soldier unless noted otherwise

• Head-count goal: BJT 100,000 vs PP 30,000 per year

• Base pay: ฿12,000 (BJT) vs ฿12,000 + 3% yearly lift (PP)

• Contract length: 4 years both; PP allows 8-year extension

• End-of-service bonus: None announced (BJT) vs ฿120,020 after 4 years (PP)

• Barracks requirement: Standard (BJT) vs commute option (PP)

Public sentiment: a generational tilt

University polls suggest a sharp age divide: nearly 60% of Thai undergraduates are “strongly opposed” to forced service, a higher share than peers in any other ASEAN country surveyed. Parents, too, are warming to reform after a series of viral clips showing hazing rituals and allegations of “outside work” using conscripts as unpaid labour on officers’ farms. The army has tried to pre-empt criticism by pointing to a jump in self-registered recruits this April—39,389, up 8,463 from the year before—but reform advocates counter that even these volunteers signed up mainly to pick their preferred branch and posting, not out of passion for service.

What happens after the ballots are counted?

Whichever party forms the next coalition must still negotiate with the Ministry of Defence, which has historically resisted rapid overhauls. Civil-military relations are calmer than in past decades, yet generals remain wary of anything that could shrink their budget share below the current 1.3% of GDP. If Bhumjaithai leads, a pilot intake of 25,000 is expected in the first fiscal year while auditors review funding. Under a People’s Party government, insiders predict an 18-month transition period before the final conscript lottery is scrapped. Either way, the first batch of entirely volunteer privates could be on parade by mid-2027. For now, Thai families eyeing next April’s draft boards may keep crossing their fingers—and watching campaign promises—until the smoke of election season clears.