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Thai Senators Push to Scrap Cambodia Gas Accord, Threatening Energy Supply

Politics,  Economy
Offshore gas platform and patrol boat in the Gulf of Thailand at sunset
By Hey Thailand News, Hey Thailand News
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A Senate panel’s unanimous call to scrap the two-decade-old maritime pact with Cambodia has jolted Bangkok’s foreign-policy circle, rekindling arguments over sovereignty, energy security and regional credibility just as tempers flare along the eastern seaboard.

At a Glance

Senate committee votes 100 % to advise the government to cancel MoU 44.

Seven main objections: from alleged violation of Thai continental-shelf rights to Phnom Penh’s claim over parts of Koh Kood.

Foreign Ministry warns that axing the pact could leave Thailand with no legal channel to tap offshore gas now worth well over $10 B.

Cabinet expected to decide whether to endorse the Senate view or defend the current framework within weeks.

Why MoU 44 Became a Lightning Rod

Signed in 2001, MoU 44 created a joint technical committee to discuss a 27,000-sq-km stretch of the Gulf where seismic surveys hint at sizeable gas and condensate deposits. For Bangkok, the deal was a stop-gap to avoid confrontation while keeping future drilling on the table. Yet critics say Phnom Penh used the lull to push a 1972 continental-shelf line that slices deep into waters long worked by Thai trawlers. The unease intensified every time Cambodian officials repeated a claim over Koh Kood, Trat’s tourism crown jewel, or issued licences to foreign explorers in the overlap.

What the Senate Actually Decided

Chaired by Senator Noppadon Inna, the ad-hoc committee met on 16 December and voted to recommend full termination of the pact. Their 7-point rationale branded MoU 44 a “dead-end, temporary deal gone stale.” Highlights:

The 1972 Cambodian shelf line is deemed an outright breach of Thai sovereignty.

Phnom Penh has signalled since 1995 it will not renegotiate that line.

Two decades of talks produced zero boundary progress.

Cambodia’s claim over all or half of Koh Kood shows a lack of goodwill.

The negotiation format “never delivered tangible results.”

A supposedly interim accord has “long outlived its shelf life.”

Broader political climate and “absence of sincerity” from Cambodia hamper dialogue.The committee also urges the Foreign Ministry to declare new straight baselines and, if talks fail, invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to walk away unilaterally.

Government Caught Between Hawks and Pragmatists

The Cabinet quietly shelved a 2024 referendum plan after the Council of State warned that plebiscites on international deals could bind future administrations. Foreign Minister Maris Saengiamphong insists MoU 44 “does not cede an inch of territory” and remains the only legal instrument guiding maritime talks. Ending it, he argues, will not erase Phnom Penh’s claim; it merely erases the forum where Thailand can contest it.

The Economic Stakes Couldn’t Be Higher

Energy analysts calculate that the upper-overlap block might hold 2–3 trillion cubic feet of gas—enough to offset dwindling production from Erawan and Bongkot for a decade. Multinationals eyeing the lower block have flagged that a treaty vacuum could trigger force-majeure lawsuits running into hundreds of millions. Investors are also wary that escalating gunboat diplomacy—Bangkok is studying a temporary Gulf closure strategy to press Cambodia back to the table—could disrupt shipping lanes linking Laem Chabang to Sihanoukville.

Legal and Diplomatic Pathways

If Bangkok follows the Senate’s advice, officials say they would first notify Phnom Penh, proposing either fresh bilateral talks under a new mandate or international arbitration at ITLOS. Cambodia could retaliate by filing its own case at the International Court of Justice, citing wrongful termination. Diplomatic veterans fear a tit-for-tat legal war would hand Beijing, already influential in Sihanoukville, a chance to expand its security footprint in the Gulf.

Voices From the Field

Burapha University scholar Olarn Thinbangtieo pins the stalemate on what he calls the “Hun Sen regime’s network economy” that profits from grey-zone casinos and laundering rings. Border fishers in Trat, meanwhile, tell the Bangkok Post they welcome a tougher line: “Every season the patrol boats push us farther west,” says 54-year-old skipper Prasert Suthamma. Energy economists counter that without a deal, Thailand may end up importing Myanmar gas at premium prices while its own reserves lie idle “beneath a no-man’s sea.”

What Happens Next

The Senate will submit its report to the upper chamber for endorsement, likely in early January.

If approved, the document heads to the Cabinet, which can adopt, modify or ignore the advice.

Bangkok’s diplomatic note to Phnom Penh—if it comes—could kick-start a six-month disengagement clock under treaty law.

Expect stepped-up naval patrols around the overlap, especially near Bloc I & II, the most promising gas leads.

Watch the investment mood at PTTEP and Chevron; either could freeze exploration budgets pending clarity.

Thailand’s political class now faces a classic dilemma: stand firm on maritime pride or keep a flawed but functioning mechanism that might one day unlock badly needed energy. The next few weeks will reveal which instinct prevails.